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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3445
___________
ANTONIUS TARGONO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                                       Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A079-734-251)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Donald V. Ferlise
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 11, 2010
Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge HARDIMAN AND COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:August 16, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Antonius Targono, an Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision upholding the Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) removal order and denying Targono’s application for withholding of
2removal.  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
I
Targono entered the United States in 2001 and remained beyond the authorized
period.  Before the IJ, he conceded removability.  Later, in 2004, Targono filed an
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection.  
In support of his application, Targono testified that, between the ages of 7 and 15,
he was repeatedly insulted by Indonesian children who shouted “Chinese, Chinese,” at
him and told him he did not deserve to be in Indonesia.  In addition, approximately three
times per week, he was stopped on the way to school by neighborhood children and
young adults who would demand money from him because they saw he was Chinese and
believed he was wealthy.  If he did not have money, they would hit him, but not enough to
cause injury.  Targono testified that the worst thing to happen to him was the taunting by
his classmates.  He also testified that he fears returning to Indonesia because of the riots
that occurred in May 1998 and because churches are being destroyed. 
The IJ denied Targono’s application, reasoning that his asylum application was
untimely and that he failed to demonstrate past persecution or a clear probability of future
persecution.  The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, but remanded for consideration of
Targono’s CAT claim, which Targono ultimately withdrew.  After further proceedings,
Targono filed a timely petition for review.
3II
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Because the BIA issued its
own opinion, we review its decision rather than that of the IJ.  See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400
F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, we also look to the decision of the IJ to the
extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ’s reasoning.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez,
446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review the Agency’s factual determinations for
substantial evidence, and will uphold such determinations unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion.  See Fiadjoe v. Att’y
Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 153 (3d Cir. 2005). 
“The threshold for establishing eligibility for withholding of removal is higher
than that for establishing entitlement to asylum and requires the alien to demonstrate a
‘clear probability’ that, upon removal to the country of origin, his or her ‘life or freedom
would be threatened on account of one of the statutorily enumerated factors.’”  Obale v.
Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210,
215 (3d Cir. 1998)).  The clear probability standard is met if an applicant shows that it is
more likely than not that he will suffer persecution.  See Miah v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 434,
439 (3d Cir. 2003).  An applicant may meet this standard by demonstrating past
persecution, which creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution, or by
demonstrating that a future threat to his life or freedom is likely, either because he will be
singled out for persecution or because he is a member of a group subject to a pattern or
4practice of persecution.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b).  Persecution includes “threats to life,
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to
life or freedom.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).  However, it “does not
encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or
unconstitutional.”  Id.
Targono presents two arguments in his petition for review.  First, he argues that the
BIA erred in concluding that he failed to demonstrate past persecution.  In denying relief,
the BIA reasoned that the incidents Targono endured, viewed cumulatively, did not rise to
the level of persecution.  We agree.  Although unfortunate, the taunting, stealing, and
hitting Targono faced were not so severe that they constituted a threat to his life or
freedom.  See id.  
Second, Targono argues that the BIA failed to consider whether a pattern or
practice of persecution against Chinese Christians exists in Indonesia.  Though the IJ
expressly held that the background evidence Targono submitted failed to demonstrate a
pattern or practice of persecution against Chinese Christians in Indonesia, the BIA did
not.  Rather, the BIA stated generally that Targono “did not show a clear probability of
persecution upon his return [to Indonesia],” AR 145, and expressly agreed with the IJ’s
holding that Targono failed to demonstrate that he would be singled out for persecution. 
Targono contends that the Board’s omission requires a remand for further consideration. 
We disagree.  “The Board is not required to write an exegesis on every contention, but
5only to show that it has reviewed the record and grasped the [alien’s] claims.”  Sevoian v.
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).  In declining to expressly discuss Targono’s “pattern or practice” claim, the
Board implicitly adopted the IJ’s reasoning.  To the extent that Targono challenges the
Agency’s determination that the background evidence he provided did not show a pattern
or practice of persecution, we agree with the Government that such a claim lacks merit. 
We held in Sioe Tjen Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008), that the
same reports Targono provided were insufficient to demonstrate such a pattern or
practice.
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.
